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EQUAL PROTECTION
Maryland economic assistance program. 45 6 The Court further
wrote that a state did not have to "choose between attacking ev-
ery aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is
enough that the state's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." 457
New York State has likewise adopted the rational basis standard
enunciated in Dandridge when determining whether legislation is
not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the New
York State Constitution. In Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center,458 the New York Court of Appeals referred to Dandridge
and found that the rational relation standard is accepted as the
proper test to be applied in the areas of economic and social
welfare legislation. 459
Therefore, in analyzing an equal protection claim under the
New York State Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals
utilizes the same principles as the United States Supreme Court
uses in analyzing an equal protection claim under the United
States Constitution. 460 To wit, social and economic legislation is
subject to the lowest form of judicial scrutiny, the rational
relation standard. Additionally, each court system condones a
"one step at a time" program for dealing with social and eco-
nomic reform.
Golden v. Clark4 6 1
(decided October 23, 1990)
Plaintiffs, various city and political party officials, voters, and
political parties, challenged the constitutionality of New York
456. Id. at 487.
457. Id. at 486-87 (citations omitted).
458. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
459. Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
460. See, e.g., Diamond v. Cuomo, 70 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 514 N.E.2d
1356, 1357, 520 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (1987); Elmwood-Utica Houses, Inc., v.
Buffalo Sewer Auth., 65 N.Y.2d 489, 495, 482 N.E.2d 549, 552, 492
N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1985); Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent
Children v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 364, 482 N.E.2d 1, 10, 492
N.Y.S.2d 522, 531 (1985).
461. 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990).
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City Charter provision, section 2604(b)(15), 462 contending that it
violated their state463 equal protection rights, impaired their
fundamental rights of free association and free speech under the
state464 constitution, and constituted an impermissible delegation
of rule-making authority to a non-legislative body. 465 The
Supreme Court, Kings County granted plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and declared the charter provision
unconstitutional. On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed
and held that the provision was constitutional. 466
The plaintiffs' first contention was that section 2604(b)(15), 467
denied them their constitutional right to equal protection under
the law by infringing on various fundamental rights. The court
explained that if the section creates classifications that burden the
exercise of a fundamental right, then the section must survive
strict scrutiny analysis in order to be declared constitutional. That
is, the classification must promote a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.468 However, if fun-
damental rights are not burdened, then the classification will be
462. New York City Charter § 2604, subd. b, para. 15.
463. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
464. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press.").
465. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be
vested in the state and assembly.").
466. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 631, 564 N.E.2d at 618, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
467. Section 2604(b)(15) states:
No elected official, deputy mayor, deputy to a citywide or boroughwide
elected official, head of any agency, or other public servant who is
charged with substantial policy discretion as defined by rule of the
board may be a member of the national or state committee of a political
party, serve as an assembly district leader of a political party or serve as
the chair or as an officer of the county committee or county executive
committee of a political party, except that a member of the council may
serve as an assembly district leader or hold any lesser political office as
defined by rule of the board.
New York City Charter § 2604, subd. b, para. 15.
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upheld if there is a "rational basis for its enactment."' 46 9 The
court concluded that strict scrutiny analysis would not apply in
this case because the city charter provision did not sufficiently
impair the plaintiffs' rights. 470
In coming to this conclusion, the court analogized this case to
Rosenstock v. Scaringe.47 1 In Rosenstock, the plaintiff challenged
a section of the Education Law which prohibited more than one
family member from being a member of the same board of edu-
cation in any school district. 472 Plaintiff claimed that the section
violated the fundamental right to seek office and to vote. The
court held that the only right directly or indirectly impacted was
the right to hold office, which is not sufficient to invoke a strict
scrutiny analysis because the right to hold office is not a funda-
mental right.4 73 The Golden court stated that it applied a rational
basis analysis and found that the section of the Education Law in
issue "was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of in-
suring that a board of education represent a wide cross section of
the community." ' 474 The Golden court further noted that in
Rosenstock, the impact on the right to vote was incidental and
"did not disenfranchise any identifiable class of the elec-
torate." 475 Consequently, the court concluded that the same ra-
tional relation analysis applied in Rosenstock should be utilized in
Golden.
Applying the rational basis test, the court noted that the pur-
pose of section 2604(b)(15) is:
[11o eliminate conflicts of interest that arise when public offi-
cials are simultaneously subject to the demands of both their
constituencies and their political parties, to broaden opportunities
for political and public participation, to reduce the opportunities
469. Id. at 624, 564 N.E.2d at 614, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (citing Maresca v.
Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1984);
Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 40 N.Y.2d 563, 357 N.E.2d 347, 388 N.Y.S.2d 876
(1976)).
470. Id. at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 615, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
471. 40 N.Y.2d 563, 357 N.E.2d 347, 388 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976).
472. Id. at 564, 357 N.E.2d at 348, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
473. Id. (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972)).
474. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 624, 564 N.E.2d at 614, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
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for corruption inherent in dual officeholding, and, through all of
these methods, to increase citizens' confidence in the integrity
and effectiveness of their government. 476
The court concluded that section 2604(b)(15) was intended to
address these legitimate state interests. Furthermore, the court
found that the section was rationally related to furthering those
interests because section 2604(b)(15) seeks to eliminate potential
conflicts of interest and opportunity for corruption. Therefore,
the statute does not violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights
under the state constitution. 477
The plaintiffs' second contention was that section 2604(b)(15)
violated their fundamental rights of free speech and association
guaranteed by the New York State Constitution article I, sections
8478 and 9.479 The court stated that the analysis to be applied is
an examination of whether the statute significantly burdens rights
guaranteed by the state constitution. If so, then the statute can
only remain "valid if it advances a compelling state interest." ' 480
The court found that the city need not supply a compelling inter-
est because section 2604(b)(15) did not impair the constitutional
rights of political parties. The section "is entirely neutral on
issues involving party politics . . . [and] does not deprive
political parties or their members of the right to associate with the
individuals of their choosing or the right to identify the people
who constitute a political party." 481 Accordingly, the court
determined that there was no violation of section 8 or section 9 of
article I of the New York State Constitution.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 615, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
477. Id. at 627, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
478. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects . . . and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.").
479. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 627, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No law shall be passed abridging the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government or any department
thereof .... ").
480. Golden, 70 N.Y.2d at 627-28, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6
(citing Eu v. San Fransisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)).
481. Id. at 628, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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The plaintiffs' final claim was that section 2604(b)(15)
"constitute[d] an impermissible delegation of rule-making au-
thority to the Conflicts of Interest Board,",482 a non-egislative
body. The section allows the Conflicts of Interest Board (Board)
to create rules in defining two specific terms. These terms are
"(1) which enumerated public servants are 'charged with sub-
stantial policy discretion' . . . and (2) the 'lesser political of-
fice[s]' a member of City Council may hold." 483 The court cited
Levine v. Whalen484 for the general rule that the legislature may
delegate its rule-making power to another agency "only if it lim-
its the field" of rule-making authority of the agency. 485 The
court noted that section 2600 sets the guiding purpose of the en-
tire chapter. Section 2603(a) delegates the rule-making authority
to the Board, but the Board must act "consistent with" the guid-
ing purpose of the chapter. The court found that these two provi-
sions, limit the field of the Board's authority and, therefore, sec-
tion 2604(b)(15) is constitutional.4 86
Judge Hancock dissented from the majority's decision.487
Judge Hancock referred to New York's long history of reading
the New York State Constitution as more protective of personal
liberties than the Federal Constitution. The dissent noted that a
strict scrutiny analysis is required for cases involving an in-
fringement of the rights of freedom of speech, association, and
the right to vote. Judge Hancock saw the failure to apply strict
scrutiny as a severe curtailment of the fundamental rights in-
volved. 488
The majority, however, had conceded that these rights are fun-
damental, but found that they were not directly impaired and,
therefore, a strict scrutiny analysis was not required. Judge
482. Id. at 630, 564 N.E.2d at 618, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
483. Id.
484. 39 N.Y.2d 510, 349 N.E.2d 820, 384 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1976).
485. Id. at 515, 349 N.E.2d at 822, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
486. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 630-31, 564 N.E.2d at 618, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
487. Id. at 631, 564 N.E.2d at 618, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
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Hancock reasoned that when there is a significant intrusion on the
freedom of expression and association, a strict scrutiny analysis
must be applied in order to avoid a severe curtailment of these
fundamental rights. 489
Further, Judge Hancock concluded that when strict scrutiny is
applied to section 2604(b)(15), it does not pass constitutional
muster. Stating that the main purposes of section 2604(b)(15) was
to prevent corruption and conflicts of interest, Judge Hancock
doubted whether these were real or compelling. Even assuming
that the interests were compelling, Judge Hancock did not believe
that section 2604(b)(15) was narrowly tailored to serve those in-
terests. In sum, Judge Hancock would prefer relying on "an alert
citizenry, diligent prosecutors and resourceful reporters" to battle
the evils of corruption rather than resorting to legislation that
burdens fundamental rights. 490
The plaintiffs' also relied on several federal decisions. 491 The
majority noted that the Supreme Court has identified two funda-
mental rights with respect to ballot access. These rights arise in
cases involving restrictions based on wealth and restrictions
flowing from classifications that burden small or new parties or
independents. 492
489. Id. at 633, 564 N.E.2d at 620, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
490. Id. at 643, 564 N.E.2d at 626, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
491. It should be noted that the plaintiffs relied solely on the state
constitution. The majority stated in a footnote that:
Although plaintiffs rest their case solely on State grounds, they have not
distinguished the State constitutional provisions from their Federal
counterparts nor have they attempted to demonstrate how the State
provisions, either singly or in combination establish any more or greater
rights than those guaranteed to the citizens of New York by the Federal
Constitution.
Id. at 623 n.2, 564 N.E.2d at 623 n.2, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 3 n.2.
492. See Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979) (striking down provisions that required a certain number of signatures
on a petition to run for office because the provision burdened the right to
associate, burdened small parties and burdened the right to vote); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (applying "close scrutiny" to a statute that
imposed large filing fees on potential candidates and held that since the state
[Vol 8320
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [2020], Art. 36
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/36
EQUAL PROTECTION
The court examined section 2604(b)(15) in light of the United
States Supreme Court decision in Clements v. Fashing.493 In
Clements, the Supreme Court upheld two provisions of the Texas
Constitution that restricted a public official from running for an-
other office until he had served his current term. 494 The Court
reasoned that these provisions did not limit political opportunity
or burden minority parties or independents. 495 Similarly, the
New York Court of Appeals found that section 2604(b)(15) im-
poses no barrier based on wealth nor does it restrict small parties
and independents. The court stated that there was no direct im-
pact on voting rights and, therefore, no fundamental rights are in-
fringed. 496
With respect to the plaintiffs' free speech and association claim
the court was not persuaded by Supreme Court cases which
plaintiffs' relied on. 497 In Eu v. San Francisco Democratic
Committee,498 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of a California statute that attempted to control the size and
composition of political parties. 499 The Court struck down the
provision because it hardened the associational and free speech
rights of the members of the political parties to choose their
leaders. 5°° Similarly, in Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut,501 the Court dealt with a Connecticut statute that
required primary voters to be registered with that primary
party. 502 Because this statute limited the party's associational
rights at the "crucial juncture" of the primary, the Court held the
statute invalid. 503
used arbitrary means to further its interests, the statute violated equal
protection).
493. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
494. Id. at 971.
495. Id. at 965.
496. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 615, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
497. Id. at 629, 564 N.E.2d at 617, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
498. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
499. Id. at 218.
500. Id. at 229-3 1.
501. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
502. Id. at 210-11 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (1985)).
503. Id. at 216-17.
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These cases involved restrictions upon the internal affairs of the
political party and, hence, violated the party's and individuals'
rights to speech and association. Whereas in the case at hand, the
court of appeals stated that section 2604(b)(15) "leaves political
parties free to organize and participate in the election process
without constraint." 50 4
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Margolis v. New York City Transit Authority505
(decided May 15, 1991)
Petitioner, one of three New York City Transit Authority (TA)
employees remaining in the position of trainmaster, was denied a
wage increase granted to other supervisory personnel in the years
1985 through 1987. He claimed the denial was arbitrary and
capricious, 506 and therefore constituted a violation of the equal
protection clause of the federal507 and state508 constitutions. 509
The court stated that the petitioner had an equal protection claim
and reversed the supreme court's decision that granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss. 510 The court stated that "the
singling out of petitioner as uniquely unqualified for general
wage increases granted all other supervisory personnel is subject
to equal protection scrutiny, and cannot be sustained in the
absence of a rational basis." 511 The court stated further that the
question of whether denial of the wage increase had the rational
basis of avoiding "the evil[s] of 'salary compression"512 was a
504. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 629, 564 N.E.2d at 617, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
505. 157 A.D.2d 238, 555 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1990).
506. Id. at 242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
507. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
508. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
509. Margolis, 157 A.D.2d at 240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
510. Id. at 241-43, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14.
511. Id. at 241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
512. Id. at 242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
322 [Vol 8
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